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a reasonable man at the time2l and it is immaterial that the parties in
settling the controversy reach a different result than the law would
have reached or that the merits ultimately prove to be on the other
side.
22
It is submitted that the Kentucky court is in line with the majority
and better view and that it follows the rule of the Restatement of Con-
tracts in requiring both the subjective requisite of a bona fide claim
and the objective requisite that it must be reasonably doubtful. It has
been said that it is the duty of courts to encourage rather than dis-
courage parties in resorting to a compromise as a mode of adjusting
conflicting claims and the nature or extent of the rights of each party
should not be closely scrutinized.23 So far as it can be done legally and
properly, the courts should support such agreements having as their
object an amicable settlement of doubtful rights. Litigation is always
burdensome and the courts should look favorably upon settlement out
of court.
JOHN W. MURPHY, JR.
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS AS BENEFICIARIES OF
PRIVATE TRUSTS
It is generally recognized that an unincorporated association can
be the beneficiary of a private trust,' although the courts have used
several theories to reach this conclusion. Courts are faced with two
problems in upholding a private trust made in favor of an unin-
corporated association. First, since the trust is a private one and must
have a definite beneficiary, who holds the equitable title? Secondly,
does such a trust contravene the rule against private indestructible
Adequacy of the consideration given is not inquired into so long as there
is something of detriment to one party or benefit to the other, however slight,
Nuckols v. Nuckols, 293 Ky. 603, 169 S.W. 2d 828 (1943); Dexter v. Duncan,
205 Ky. 344, 265 S.W. 832 (1924); Barr v. Gilmour, 204 Ky. 582, 265 S.W. 6
(1924); even though the amount is greatly disproportionate to what a party
would be legally bound to pay. Bates v. Todd's Heirs, 14 Ky. 177 (1823).
"Murphy v. Henry, 311 Ky. 799, 225 S.W. 2d 662 (1949); Forsythe v.
Rexroat, 234 Ky. 173, 27 S.W. 2d 695 (1930); Berry v. Berry, 183 Ky. 481, 209
S.W. 855 (1919); Gray v. U. S. Savings and Loan Co., 116 Ky. 967, 77 S.W.
200 (1903); Mills Heirs v. Lee, 22 Ky. (6 Mon.) 91, 97 (1827).
Moore v. Sutton, 311 Ky. 174, 223 S.W. 2d 737 (1949); Childs v. Hamilton,
308 Ky. 203, 214 S.W. 2d 106 (1948); Nuckols v. Nuckols, 293 Ky. 603, 169 S.W.
2d 828 (1943); Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., of Chattanooga, Tenn., v.
Ramsey, 256 Ky. 126, 75 S.W. 2d 781 (1934).
'P-H Wi.LLs, ESTATES AND TRUSTS SEV. see. 3663 (1950).
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trusts? The primary purpose of this note is to discuss the first question;
the second will be treated only collaterally.
Historically courts would not enforce a private trust created for
an unincorporated association because it was thought that such as-
sociations were incapable of taking the equitable title, and it was con-
ceived that the trust failed for want of a definite beneficiary.2 Later
such trusts were upheld on the theory that the title vested in the mem-
bers of the association.3 Another theory was that the association itself
took as beneficiary, giving recognition to the association as a separate
entity capable of holding the equitable title independently of its in-
dividual members.4 Other courts have simply upheld such trusts with-
out explanation as to theory.5
The whole problem historically was complicated by the lack of
legal capacity in such organizations. For centuries the position of unin-
corporated associations before the law was rather awkward because
they could not hold property except in the names of the individual
members,6 nor could they sue or be sued except in the names of the
members.7 The typical early associations were the partnership and
'Kain v. Gibonney, 101 U. S. 862 (1879); Mayfield v. Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. of Baltimore, 150 Md. 157, 182 A. 594 (1926); Lane v. Eaton, 69 Minn. 141,
71 N.W. 1081 (1904); German Land Association v. Konstantine Scholler, 10 Minn.
260 (1865); Miller v. Rosenberger, 144 Mo. 292, 46 S.W. 167 (1898); Murray
v. Miller, 178 N. Y. 316, 70 N.E. 870 (1904); Stewart v. Green, Ir. R. 5 Eq. 470,
481 (1870).
'The third thing to be rspected is, the cestui que use; for to every good use,
as there must be a person seise to use, so there must be a person to whose use he
is seised, and he must be capable also .... And if a feoffment be made to I. S. and
his heirs, to the use of the parishioners of Dale; this use is void, for they are in-
capable by this name: and it shall be to the use of the feoffer, [by resulting use]"
SnEPPAR;'S ToucHSToNE OF CO,\mON AssumANcEs 509 (7th ed. 1821).
'San Juan Gold Co. v. San Juan Ridge Mut. Water Ass'n., 34 Cal. App. 159,
93 P. 2d 582 (1989); Hart v. Seymour, 147 II. 598, 35 N.E. 246 (1893) (Massa-
chusetts business trust); Comstock v. Dewey, 323 Mass. 583, 83 N.E. 2d 257
(1949); Howe v. Morse, 174 Mass. 491, 55 N.E. 213 (1899) (Massachusetts
business trust); Turner v. Ontonagan River Imp. Co., 77 Mich. 610, 43 N.W.
1062 (1889) (business association); Venus Lodge No. 62, F. & A.M. v. Acme
Benevolent Ass'n., Inc., 231 N.C. 552, 58 S.E. 2d 109 (1950); Clark v. Brown,
(Tex. Civ. App.) 108 S.W. 421, 433 (1908). In some of these cases it is not
clear whether it was the members of the association at the time of the trust's
creation who took the title, or whether the members from time to time took. The
latter interpretation is probably what the courts intended.
'Ruddick v. Albertson, 154 Cal. 640, 98 P. 1045 (1908); Wilbur v. Portland
Trust Co., 121 Conn. 535, 186 At. 499 (1936). In Amish v. Gelhaus, 71 Iowa
170, 32 N.W. 318 (1887) the court seemed to regard a congregation as an entity.
'Weaver v. First National Bank, 216 Ark. 199, 224, S.W. 2d 813 (1949);
Appeal of Cox, 126 Me. 256, 137 A. 771 (1927) (trust upheld by implication);
Normandy Consol. School Dist. of St. Louis Count, v. Harral, 315 Mo. 602, 286
S.W. 86, 92 (1926); Appeal of Woolford, 126 Pa. 47, 17 A. 524 (1889).
'See CANE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIs AND OTHER UNIN-
CORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS 529-530 (1952), and WRIGHTiNcTON, THE LAW OF
UNINCORPORATED ASsOCIATIONS Am BusuNss TRusTs 336-337 (1923).
'See CRANE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 538-539, for cases see 539 notes 28 and
29; W IGHTINGTON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 425-427.
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the religious society. The former flourished, its economic advantages
outweighing its legal disadvantages, and a separate body of partner-
ship law developed which is similar in many respects to the law of
non-profit associations but which is markedly different in other re-
spects." Religious societies also flourished, and since they could usually
be classified as charities they were able to enjoy the benefits of prop-
erty through the device of charitable trusts which required no definite
beneficiary. But in recent modem times, however, other types of as-
sociations have taken on increased importance socially and economic-
ally, such as labor unions, college fraternities, and fraternal organiza-
tions, but there has not been a corresponding development of their
legal status.
As these newer types of associations increased in activity, size and
wealth it became desirable to develop direct legal methods of pro-
tecting their rights and property. By statute business associations were
allowed to take title to land9 and to sue and be sued in their own
names.10 Under such statutes it would not seem difficult to uphold a
trust made in favor of such an association as an entity. But these
statutes do not apply to other types of associations.
Related to the problem of finding an appropriate theory on which
to uphold a trust in favor of an unincorporated association is the
question of whether such a trust needs a beneficiary at all, or to put
it another way: how should such a trust be classified? A beneficiary is
necessary to the existence of a private trust because there must be
someone to enforce it against the trustee," whereas a charitable trust
is enforceable at the suit of the attorney general.12 In this sense a
8 Much of partnership law stems from the Law Merchant which, of course,
does not hold true for the non-business types of associations. CRANE, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 5-7. An association will not be terminated upon the death, withdrawal
or bankruptcy of a member or a group of members as in the case of a partnership.
Miller v. International Union of United Brewers, Flour, Cereal, and Softdrink
Workers of America, 187 Va. 889, 48 S.E. 2d 252 (1948). A member of an as-
sociation has no authority to bind the others. Chastain v. Baxter, 139 Kan. 381,
31 P. 2d 21 (1934).
OK.A. STATS. see. 361 e (1941) (farm co-ops); W. VA. CODE sec. 4671(1)
(business associations). In states which have adopted see. 8(3) of the Uniform
Partnership Act real property can be held in the partnership name. See Unif. Laws
Ann. 7-57 (1949) n. 4.
"See Am. Jur. 486, 487; and cases cited at 486, notes 20, 1 and 2.
U See I Scorr, THE LAw OF TRusTs 615 and 621-625. A notable exception
to this rule is found in the case of so-called "honorary" trusts set up for the benefit
of animals, or for the saying of masses, or the maintaining of graves or memorials.
Such trusts have no beneficiary which can enforce the trust, nor are they charitable,
but they are upheld nonetheless. Angus v. Noble, 73 Conn. 56, 46 Ad. 278 (1900)
(keeping a grave clean); Coleman v. O'Leary's Ex'r., 114 Ky. 388, 70 S.W. 1068
1902) (masses); In re Dean, 41 Ch. D. 552 (1899) (animals).
"People ex rel. Courtney, State's Attorney, 327 Ill. App. 231, 63 N.E. 2d 794
(1945). And see III Sco-r, THE LA-,w OF Thusrs 2052-2053 (1939).
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charitable trust does not need a beneficiary. But any private trust
must depend on a beneficiary for its enforceability, and the critical
problem is: can an unincorporated association meet this requirement?
If there is some "person" who can enforce the trust there would be no
difficulty in adjudging the trust valid. In the private trust the person
or persons who can enforce the trust-the beneficiaries-are said to
have the equitable title. In a trust for an association we shall see that
this requirement of enforceability-this requirement of a beneficiary-
is satisfied and the courts are fully justified in upholding them.
Probably the best modem explanation of the problems involved in
-upholding private trusts in favor of unincorporated associations is
given by Scott. He sees no difficulty in vesting the equitable title in
the association or its members as beneficiaries since in either case the
trust is enforceable against the trustee. 13 He indicates the only real
difficulty arises where a trust for the association as such is to continue
beyond the period of the "rule against perpetuities."14 He is of the
opinion if the trust were to last the life of the association it would
exceed the period and be invalid.' 5 To avoid such invalidity he would
require that the trust by its terms be capable of being consumed or
terminated within the period of the rule. He would not require that
such a disposal be made within the period, but only that it be pos-
sible.16 This is the English rule,' and has been incorporated into the
Restatement of Trusts.'8 Bogert does not mention the perpetuities
problem in his treatment of such trusts, but he does point out the
various theories which have been used to support them, and he ap-
proves the modern trend of upholding them.'9
Let us assume a trust "To T for the benefit of X Brotherhood (Fra-
ternity Chapter, Lodge, etc.)," and assume that it has provisions for
its exhaustion or termination within the period of the rule. A court
looking for a resting place for the equitable title of such a trust has
several choices. It may determine that the title vests in the individual
members of the Brotherhood as it is constituted at the time of the
creation of the trust.20 This solution meets the enforceability require-
ment since those members can enforce it, and it constitutes no problem
under the rule against perpetual private trusts since the duration
necessarily will be measured by lives in being. However, the solution
'I ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 598-599 (1939).
:"ibid. at 599.
" Ibid. at 599-601.
" Ibid. at 604, see n. 24.
'In Re Drummond, 2 Ch. 90 (1914).
RESTATFNmT, TRUSTS sec. 119 (1935).
"I BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 488-492 (1935).
'o See cases cited supra note 3.
NoTEs AND CovnamN'rs
is inconsistent with the intention of the settlor since it was probably
his intention that the trust be capable of existing so long as the associa-
tion exists in its present general form with its present general objects21
(subject, of course, to the Brotherhood's power of termination). If he
had intended for it to cease upon the death of the last old member he
could easily have indicated that intention in more explicit terms. Most
laymen seem to consider an association as a distinct entity existing
apart from the individual membership in much the same manner that
they consider the distinctness of a corporation. 22 With this thought in
mind when he created the trust, he probably intended that it last the
life of the Brotherhood.
On the other band, a court may determine that the equitable title
vests in the members of the Brotherhood as they exist from time to
time.23 This solution will satisfy the settlor's intention since the trust
could exist as long as there is a membership in the association, though
it does not satisfy it in quite the manner that he had in mind, and it
will satisfy the requirement for definite beneficiaries. But, there is an
air of artificiality about this rationalization. The "beneficiaries" do not
really have much to call their own. The interest they possess is de-
pendent upon their continued membership in the association; they
lose this "interest" without compensation when they cease being mem-
bers.24 The interest is of no economic value to them since there is no
market for it, and it would probably not be transferrable at all since
it is so intimately bound up with membership.25 A member has very
little individual control over his beneficial interest except in conjunc-
tion with other members; the members can exert no control over
associate property except in their associate capacity.2 6 They stand
toward the Brotherhood as sort of trustees of the beneficial interest for
it. Their position is much the same as the attorney general in a
charitable trust. The critical issue arises when it is effectively voted to
terminate the trust and sell the corpus-to whom will the proceeds be
distributed? Since the individual members are termed the "bene-
ficiaries" of the trust they could convincingly argue that they should
"See Bancroft v. Cook, 264 Mass. 343, 162 N.E. 691 (1928) where a college
fraternity was held ineligible under a trust since it had altered its form and objects.
S ee Stewart v. Green, Ir. R. 5 Eq. 570 at 481 (1870), and see Laski,
Personality of Associations, 29 HAnv. L. RE.v. 404, 404-405 (1916), and CnANE,
op. cit. supra note 6 at 12.
" See cases supra note 3.
- Liggett v. Koivunen, 227 Minn. 114, 34 N.W. 2d 345 (1948); Harris et al.
ex rel. Carpenters' Union No. 2573 of Marshfield, Ore., Lumber and Sawmill
Workers v. Backman, 160 Ore. 620, 86 P. 2d 456 (1939).
"Though in the case of a business association it might be transferrable c.f.
Howe v. Morse, 174 Mass. 491, 55 N.E. 213 at 214 (1899).
'See cases cited supra note 24.
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personally receive the proceeds . 7 But, this was not the settlor's in-
tention; we have shown that he had the association in mind when he
created the trust and not the individual members. It would be his
intention that if and when the trust was properly terminated the pro-
ceeds should go to the association and to no one else.
It would seem that to recognize an unincorporated association as a
separate entity capable of holding equitable title would be the most
simple and direct solution of our problem.2 8 The settlor's intentions
would be satisfied since the beneficial interest is in the association
where he intended it to be and the trust will exist as long as he in-
tended. It will be subject to the will of the association in exactly the
manner which he had in mind, i.e., the association can control the
trust according to its customary procedures without any objections by
individual members of infringment of their "personal rights." The title
vests once and for all in the association and is not even ambulatory.
The rule against perpetual trusts is not violated because the unin-
corporated association, as in the case of corporations, should be per-
mitted to be the beneficiary of a private trust despite the fact that it
might exist in perpetuity.29 We assume, of course, that the trust could
not of its terms be one of perpetual indestructibility. A trust set up
for the benefit of an unincorporated association should conform to the
normal rules governing private trusts so far as destructibility is con-
cemed.30 The mere fact that the trust has a potential existence of in-
finity should not vitiate it.
In conclusion it would seem that to recognize the ability of an
unincorporated association to be its own beneficiary is the most de-
sirable solution of the problems presented by such private trusts. It
squares with the intention of the parties involved and it is the easiest
to legally justify and administer. Unquestionably it represents the
modem attitude toward unincorporated associations.
Ciius N. CArams
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PROTECTION ACCORDED THE
OFFICER WHO ARRESTS UNDER A DEFECTIVE WARRANT
In any examination of the effect of an arrest under a defective war-
rant upon the rights of the arresting officer it is necessary to give some
consideration to the nature of the warranti Though there are numerous
'As was done to no avail by the individual members in Crawford v. Gross,
140 Pa. 297, 21 A. 356 (1891).
See cases supra note 4.
See I Sco-r, THE LAw OF TRUSTS 589 (1939).
Ibid. at 392-393.
